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Abstract
We explore the links between migration of labour and location
specific (urban) pollution, suggesting a sense in which pollution can be
welfare improving. In a conventional Harris-Todaro model of urban-rural
migration, individuals migrate so as to equate the expected urban wage
(given a downward rigid real wage in the urban sector) to the real wage.
Unemployment is endogenously determined. Interpreting unemployment
as damage, urban pollution (damage denoted in units of labour) can also
support the same equilibrium with the value of damage equal to the value
of resources otherwise lost through unemployment. However, if the
damage function implies an uninternalized externality (due to urban
congestion, for instance), an internalization gain can be realized through
the use of a Pigouvian tax (or instrument) that discourages migration.
Thus if pollution is introduced into a Harris-Todaro model with no such
features, environmental damage displaces unemployment to support a
similar outcome. Internalizing the externality then yields a welfare gain.
We characterize the optimal Pigouvian tax in such a case and show that it
is, in general, non-zero. In this sense, then, pollution can be welfare
improving perhaps suggesting an alternative view of congestion and other
adverse environmental effects facing urban dwellers in the developing
world.
JEL Classification: O1,O18,J6,Q21
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I. Introduction
The idea that introducing or intensifying pollution can, in certain circumstances,
increase welfare seems at first glance odd, if not strongly counter intuitive. In this
paper, however, we show how in a Harris-Todaro (1970) model of rural-urban
migration, pollution that is concentrated in the urban area can serve to substitute for
urban unemployment and can in certain circumstances be beneficial when the
comparison is to a with unemployment equilibrium. Essentially, the argument is that
if migrants take into account the money metric welfare equivalent of damage in their
migration decisions, then introducing pollution in urban areas will tend to reduce
urban unemployment. We show that where damage is denominated in units of labor
(such as travel time lost to congestion), for any given Harris-Todaro equilibrium with
no damage there exists a damage level giving the same equilibrium allocation of labor
in the urban and rural sectors, but with no unemployment. Damage merely substitutes
for unemployment both in the migration decision and in the full employment
condition in the labor markets.1
We then argue that, given this equivalence, we can formulate an explicit
damage function generating the damage level needed for equivalence to the no
pollution Harris-Todaro unemployment equilibrium. If we use an exponential damage
function defined over the amount of labor in the urban sector (reflecting congestion
costs), the power in the function gives the ratio between marginal and average
damage. This represents an uninternalized externality, and welfare gains can be
achieved relative to the market (uninternalized) equilibrium by using an
internalization mechanism such as a Pigouvian migration tax. For this to be the case

1

For a recent discussion of other alternative approaches to modelling the incentives for rural-urban
migration in the Harris-Todaro model see Agesa (2000).
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the downward rigid urban real wage in the Harris-Todaro formulation must be
allowed to vary.
In this sense, then, pollution can serve to be welfare improving by first
displacing resource wasteful activities such as unemployment, and secondly by
creating opportunities for further gains through the internalization of external effects.
While only a possibility, the thrust of the argument is that urban specific congestion
and degradation, while distasteful to most people, nevertheless has the benefit in some
developing countries of slowing urban migration driven by non-market interventions
tilted in favor of urban employees as discussed by Harris and Todaro.

II. The Models
Consider a small open economy facing fixed world prices of the two goods it
produces – an agricultural good (A) and a manufactured good (M). Amounts of the
two goods are denoted by QA and QM respectively. The relative price of agricultural
goods in terms of manufactured goods is p and is taken as being determined in world
markets.
The production function for the agricultural sector is:
Q A = FA (T A , L A )

(1)

where TA is a fixed factor – land and LA is labor.
Similarly, the output of the manufacturing sector is:
QM = FM ( K M , LM )

(2)

where KM is capital in the manufacturing sector, and LM is labour. Labour is the sole
mobile factor across sectors. The two other factors are fixed, and sector specific.
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The Harris-Todaro version of the Model
In a traditional Harris-Todaro (1970) model the labour market equilibrium
condition is written as:
WM (

∂F
LM
)= p A
LM + U
∂L A

(3)

where WM is the fixed urban wage and U is unemployment. The left hand side of (3)
represents the expected wage and the right hand side represents the agricultural wage
(equal to the value marginal product of labor in agriculture). This is the HarrisTodaro equilibrium migration condition.
Profit maximizing producers in the urban sector hire labour until the marginal
product of labor in this sector equals the fixed urban wage, i.e.
WM =

∂FM
∂LM

.

(4)

Labour market clearing requires that
LM + L A + U = L

(5)

where L is the total availability of labor.
Equations (3), (4) and (5) provide a system of three equations in three
unknowns, LA, LM and U, given the supply of land in agriculture and capital in the
urban sector; the well-known Harris-Todaro model. The downward rigid real wage in
the urban sector generates sector specific unemployment; government intervention to
discourage migration is merited.
Relative to the earlier Lewis (1954) model which was taken to support trade
protection of the modern sector to draw surplus labour receiving its average not
marginal product out of the traditional sector, surplus labour (unemployment) in the
Harris Todaro model is in the urban not the rural sector. Trade protection which
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typically serves to promote the size of the manufacturing sector (if the country is a net
importer of manufactures) will increase unemployment and compound traditional
welfare costs of protection. Harris and Todaro also discussed restrictions on internal
migration within countries as a welfare improving policy in such circumstances.

The Equivalent Pollution Model
Given the Harris-Todaro structure, we can also formulate a closely related
model of urban rural migration in which environmental damage is sector (location)
specific, and its costs to workers enter the migration decision for labour. In such a
model, sector specific environmental damage operates similarly to unemployment in
deterring migration to the urban sector.
For simplicity, suppose that there is pollution only in the urban sector and the
damage from pollution is denominated in units of labour. Pollution can thus be
thought of as reducing the efficiency of labour employed in the urban sector through
congestion, poor air quality, higher incidence of disease and other externality effects.
The costs of such damage are borne fully by urban workers. Urban firms pay a wage
equal to the marginal product of labour but the effective wage (in money metric
terms) received by workers is the wage net of the average damage inflicted.
We consider an equilibrium in which the per worker cost of pollution (or
damage) in the urban sector is exactly equal to the expected costs of unemployment in
the Harris-Todaro model. The differential between urban and rural wage rates will
now equal average damage per urban worker. As differing amounts of damage will
be associated with differing levels of migration we also need to remove the fixed
urban wage which we now allow to vary.
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Thus, instead of equation (5) we will now have a market clearing condition in
the labour market
LM + L A + D = L

(5’)

where D is urban environmental damage denominated in units of labour. From the
production side the urban wage again equals the marginal product of labor, and we
have
WM =

∂FM
.
∂LM

(4’)

However, in this case, the new labor market equilibrium condition is
 LM 
∂F
 = p A
WM 
∂L A
 LM + D 

(3’)

(3’), (4’) and (5’) again provide equilibrium conditions for the three unknowns: LA,
LM and WM.
In this formulation, D can be chosen in such a way that its labour equivalent
exactly equals unemployment, and the value of WM in this model is exactly equal to
the fixed urban wage WM in the earlier Harris-Todaro model. The two models are
thus equivalent in generating the same equilibrium outcome. Environmental damage
displaces unemployment, or alternatively unemployment in Harris-Todaro models can
be reinterpreted as damage.2

III. Optimal Policy in the Equivalent Damage Model
The equilibrium solution for the pollution equivalent model is, however, not
production efficient in the Pareto sense since there is now an externality that can be
internalized. To see this, we can characterize Pareto efficiency and the associated
2

Other recent literature has focused on tax issues rather then environmental issues in the context of
rural-urban migration in the Harris-Todaro model; see Gupta (1993), Partridge and Rickman (1997),
Bhatia (2002) and Chau and Khan (2001).
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Pigouvian tax needed to support an efficient allocation as a market outcome. For
analytical tractability we consider the exponential damage function D= LMλ.3
Thus, a Pareto efficient allocation can be characterized as a solution to the
optimisation problem:
max XM
subject to: X A ≥ X A and LM + LλM + L A = L .
If we consider the Lagrangean:

[ (

L = FM (K M , LM ) + µ1 [FA (T A , L A ) − X A ] + µ 2 LM 1 + LM

λ −1

)+ L

A

−L

]

(6)

where µ1 and µ2 are Lagrange multipliers, first order conditions yield:
∂FM
+ µ2Z = 0
∂LM

(7a)

∂FA
+ µ2 = 0
∂L A

(7b)

µ1
where

Z = (1 + LM

λ −1

) + LM (λ − 1) LM

λ −2

Combining (7a) and (7b) yields the efficiency condition

(

∂FM
∂F
λ −1
λ −1
= µ1 A (1 + LM ) + (λ − 1) LM
∂LM
∂L A

)

(8)

This condition has a simple interpretation. When a worker leaves the agricultural
sector for the manufacturing sector there is a drop in agricultural output, measured by
the marginal product of labor in the agricultural sector but there is also a loss due to
added congestion in the urban sector (the term Z). At the optimum the marginal
product of labor in the manufacturing sector must compensate for these two losses

3

See the use of this same damage function in Abrego and Whalley (2001).
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evaluated at the shadow price of a unit of agricultural output µ1 . This, then,
characterizes efficient production in this economy.
It is easy to see that the efficiency condition (8) will not be generated by a
perfectly competitive price mechanism. The marginal rate of transformation between
the two goods will, in a competitive equilibrium, be equated to the relative price ratio
p. This does not satisfy (8).
From (3’) we obtain
∂FM ∂L A
λ −1
= p (1 + LM )
∂LM ∂FA

(9)

whereas for Pareto efficiency (from (8)) this marginal rate of transformation should be

(

∂FM ∂L A
λ −1
λ −1
= µ1 (1 + LM ) + (λ − 1) LM
∂LM ∂FA

)

(10)

An optimal Pigouvian tax reflects the difference between the MRT under
Pareto efficiency and the MRT without a tax. In other words we want to set

(

p(1 + t ) 1 + LM

λ −1

) = µ {(1 + L
1

λ −1
M

) + (λ − 1)L }
λ −1

M

(11)

where t is the rate for the Pigouvian tax. From (11) we can solve for t as:
λ −1
µ1  (λ − 1)LM 
−1
t=
1 +
λ −1 
p 
(1 + LM ) 

(12)

If µ1 = p , this corresponds to a case where no distortions exist in output markets, and
domestic prices equal world prices. In this case, with utility maximizing behaviour by
households, t =

(λ − 1)LM λ −1 which yields an optimal tax rate given as the ratio of
(1 + LM

λ −1

)

marginal to average damage.
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If, however, there are distortions in output markets so that µ1 ≠ p , then the
optimal (second best) Pigouvian tax will need to be correspondingly modified. In the
special case where
µ1 =

p (1 + LM
(1 + LM

λ −1

λ −1

)

) + (λ − 1) LM

(13)

λ −1

then the optimal tax rate t = 0. This is a case where output market distortions and
distortions of migration decisions via urban environmental damage offset each other.
Generally, however, some optimal Pigouvian tax on the use of labour in the
urban sector will be called for, and gains relative to a competitive migration
equilibrium with an uninternalized externality can be achieved. In this sense then,
urban specific pollution (damage) when introduced into a no pollution Harris-Todaro
model can be beneficial in providing welfare gains relative to a no pollution HarrisTodaro equilibrium with unemployment. Urban damage displaces urban
unemployment, and then yields an externality that can be internalised.

IV. Concluding Remarks
This short paper suggests that the generally held view that urban pollution
(congestion, health effects) is bad is subject to analytical challenge. In a HarrisTodaro model of urban-rural migration, if unemployment is thought of as damage
then urban specific environmental damage has similar effects on migration, and a
form of model equivalence can be shown between with and without pollution variants
of related models. If an explicit damage function is then considered, internalization
gains beyond this equilibrium are possible and hence introducing pollution (damage)
into a Harris-Todaro model can lead to welfare improvements in this sense.

8

This is not to say that urban pollution in Asia and elsewhere is necessarily
good, merely to make the point that it can offset bad effects elsewhere
(unemployment). In particular cases it can be viewed as welfare improving when
introduced into a no pollution model with unemployment in urban areas since it first
displaces unemployment, then creates an externality that can be internalized.
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